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The focus of this monograph is, as its title suggests, the ethical stance of the spoudaios in 
Plotinus’ Enneads. Schniewind, hereafter S, provides in her introduction an accurate summary 
of the work of previous writers on Plotinus’ ethical theory. This summary demonstrates that 
there is some disagreement as to whether or not Plotinus provides an ethic that is applicable 
to the ordinary man, as opposed to the spoudaios. A number of writers, this reviewer 
included, have found it difficult to see what practical ethical guidance is available to the 
ordinary man in the egoistic behaviour of the Plotinian spoudaios. Yet Porphyry’s Life 
presents Plotinus, whom one must assume was a spoudaios, as a figure deeply involved with 
the life of the community and not the austere figure that the Enneads seem to conjure up. S 
claims that this dichotomy can be resolved upon examination of the figure of the spoudaios, 
and in the seven chapters that make up this monograph, she argues her case in a thorough 
and scholarly manner.  
 
Chapter one examines the historical context for the term spoudaios, examining its 
development prior to its use by Plotinus. S notes the importance of Aristotle in imbuing the 
term with moral connotations. The Stoics used the term interchangeably with sophos, and, 
Plotinus borrowing from both, employs the term to describe a man who has reduced the 
aspects of his corporeal self to a minimum, and become self-conscious at the level of his 
higher soul in the timelessness of Intellect. Like the Stoic sophos, the Plotinian spoudaios 
displays little emotion concerning the events of the sense world, which is a mere reflection 
of true life in Intellect. Since wise, good, fulfilled etc, simply do not do justice to what 
Plotinus means by the spoudaios, S sensibly transliterates throughout.  
 
In essence, chapters 2-6 examine Ennead I. 4 [46], “On Well-Being” (Peri Eudaimonias), since 
it contains the most sustained analysis of the spoudaios to be found in Plotinus. S considers 
its ethical content in terms of its chronological position within the Enneads as a whole, and 
its position within the first Ennead. She discusses the probable make-up of the audience that 
attended Plotinus’ school and speculates on the recipients of the written work. I have some 
reservations when she suggests that I. 4 was intended for three different groups: Chapters 
1-4 for basic listeners, 5-11 for disciples (more advanced) and 12-16 for assistants (most 
advanced). Although S does admit that this division is somewhat artificial, she continues to 
use these groupings throughout her analysis of I. 4.  Chapter 3 looks at the definition of 
eudaimonia as presented in this treatise and explores the first four parts of the treatise in 
the style of a commentary. S shows good understanding in her appraisal of the structure of 
Plotinus’ argument here. Chapter 4 examines the ontological difference between the ordinary 
man and the spoudaios, captured well in French by ‘l’ autre homme’ and ‘l’ homme autre’. S 
identifies three types of men, the spoudaios, who obviously has no need of ethical guidance; 
the middle-man who is capable of being guided; and the wretch who is incapable of being 
guided. These varieties of men provide for a complicated ethic.  Chapter 5 argues that the 
spoudaios, existing on a higher ontological level, sees things differently from the ordinary 
man. Essentially his ethical guidance consists in the example he sets to others, displaying the 
correct unemotional attitude to body, demonstrating the upward path to self-consciousness. 
But what sort of man does this make the spoudaios? S herself accepts that Plotinus’ notion 
of concern for himself and others is quite complex. Chapter 7 looks at other treatises in the 
Enneads where she claims the spoudaios endorses an educational rôle towards other men. 
There is good analysis of the higher and lower soul, the higher soul must encourage the lower 
one to imitate it; this is presented as a parallel of what the ordinary man must do in relation 
to the spoudaios. Of course, it is only the middle-man who is capable of such imitation, 
whereas the wretch is beyond the pale. S concludes that the Enneads present a constructive 
dualism between the higher and lower man, and not a division which leads to an uncaring 
spoudaios. She claims that there is indeed an ethic for the ordinary man (or rather the 
middle-man), which she finds essentially in the model of the spoudaios. The book closes with 
an excellent bibliography and indices of the Enneads referred to, ancient authors cited and 
the chief topics discussed.  
 
This is a well-written book. S’s scholarly exactitude is impressive. She has worked through 
Ennead  I. 4, in particular, in a thoughtful and sympathetic way. She gives the reader much to 
think about in terms of the structure of this and other treatises, and although I am not 
convinced entirely that I. 4 was written with three different types of reader in mind, I was 
made to think a great deal about nature of Plotinus’ argument here. Ultimately, however, she 
does not convince me completely that in the figure of the spoudaios there really is a practical 
ethic for the ordinary man in the Enneads. The spoudaios found in the Enneads, would still 
seem to me to be an uncaring one, in the normal sense of that word, quite unlike the figure 
that Porphyry describes in the Life of Plotinus. While this book will not be the last word on 
this topic, I found it interesting and thought provoking, and it will provide a stimulus for 
those interested in Plotinus’ ethical theory.   
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